Ideas from 'Ontology' by Dale Jacquette [2002], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Ontology' by Jacquette,Dale [Acumen 2002,1-902683-56-0]].

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4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic

7689	The modal logic of C.I.Lewis was only interpreted by Kripke and Hintikka in the 1960s

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic

7681	Logic describes inferences between sentences expressing possible properties of objects

5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 2. Platonism in Logic

7682	Logic is not just about signs, because it relates to states of affairs, objects, properties and truth-values

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions

7697	On Russell's analysis, the sentence "The winged horse has wings" comes out as false

5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / d. Russell's paradox

7701	Can a Barber shave all and only those persons who do not shave themselves?

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being

7707	To grasp being, we must say why something exists, and why there is one world

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence

7687	Existence is completeness and consistency

7692	Being is maximal consistency

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies

7679	Ontology is the same as the conceptual foundations of logic

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment

7678	Ontology must include the minimum requirements for our semantics

7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories

7683	Logic is based either on separate objects and properties, or objects as combinations of properties

7684	Reduce states-of-affairs to object-property combinations, and possible worlds to states-of-affairs

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets

7703	If classes can't be eliminated, and they are property combinations, then properties (universals) can't be either

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects

7685	An object is a predication subject, distinguished by a distinctive combination of properties

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta

7699	Numbers, sets and propositions are abstract particulars; properties, qualities and relations are universals

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds

7691	The actual world is a consistent combination of states, made of consistent property combinations

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds

7688	The actual world is a maximally consistent combination of actual states of affairs

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / c. Worlds as propositions

7695	Do proposition-structures not associated with the actual world deserve to be called worlds?

7694	We must experience the 'actual' world, which is defined by maximally consistent propositions

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia

7706	If qualia supervene on intentional states, then intentional states are explanatorily fundamental

17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind

7704	Reduction of intentionality involving nonexistent objects is impossible, as reduction must be to what is actual

19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions

7702	The extreme views on propositions are Frege's Platonism and Quine's extreme nominalism